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 Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to consider if Amazon’s increase in private label brands is the tipping point 
for transforming the e-commerce giant into a monopoly. To lay the foundation, we initially explore the 
culture, leadership, and business practices which are unique to Amazon that enabled the company to 
become one of the U.S.’s largest and fastest growing e-commerce websites. Introduced in 2009, 
Amazon’s private label business has further propelled Amazon’s growth while creating a competitive 
advantage for the company by offering high quality products to their customers at low cost options. In 
considering whether private label brands affect Amazon’s status as a monopoly, we first examine exactly 
what a monopoly is and if Amazon can be classified as one in its current state. We then take a deep dive 
into Amazon’s private label strategy, analyzing past performance to make educated assumptions about 
the future. Our research provided evidence indicating that Amazon’s actions are threatening the 
cooperative nature of its Marketplace by creating substantial barriers to entry and increasing Amazon’s 
market share. With this knowledge we make predictions about Amazon’s future and whether it will ever 
be seen as a monopoly under the economic, legal, and/or social definitions. While Amazon’s case is 
unprecedented, this paper sources leading economists, journalists, and other academic research to 
support our theory. 
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 Introduction & Objectives 
Within the US retail market, a generalization can be made that every consumer and producer 
has had their shopping experience influenced by Amazon in one way or another over the past twenty 
years, whether it be in the way that they shop / sell goods, or through the disruption Amazon has 
brought to the online and brick-and-mortar retail market. Retail, and more specifically e-commerce, has 
experienced remarkable growth since the turn of the century, fueled in part by Amazon’s disruptive and 
innovative go-to market strategies. Amazon’s impact has been multifaceted to both consumers and 
producers by creating new standards and changing expectations on both sides of the market. Amazon’s 
disruption to the industry has been sustained by their diverse product portfolio, ranging from cloud 
computing services to distribution services to consumer products and subscriptions (most notably, 
Amazon Prime). At the center of the web is Amazon’s Marketplace, connecting retailers with consumers 
around the world. In addition to providing a platform for merchandisers of any size, Amazon has become 
a player of its own game through the creation of its own private label brands. 
Within this case study we will analyze the steps Amazon has taken to becoming the United 
States’ largest e-commerce retailer (e-retailer) and predict how it will continue to grow through the 
launch of its private label brands, competing directly against the firms it advertises its marketplace 
services to. Through the use of private label Amazon is able to compete aggressively against other firms 
by offering lower consumer prices combined with Amazon’s remarkable reputation and without 
sacrificing product quality. In addition to consumer facing brands, Amazon is quietly building a supply 
chain of which they have total control over. While the scope of this case study is limited to the impact 
their private label brands are having, it is critical to note that Amazon is paving their path to success 
through omnipresence control over the entire supply and value chains.  
We feel it is safe to say that Amazon is a remarkable organization. Since its inception the 
company has redefined consumer expectations in regards to buying goods and services, starting from 
humble beginnings as an online book store. With its recent acquisition of Whole Foods, the expectation 
is set that Amazon is looking to take over retail, both within the physical and online spaces. With its 
disruptiveness towards the retail market, we wonder how far Amazon will go; will it become a monopoly 
or is it perhaps already one? Within the following sections of this case study we will attempt to illustrate 
the relationship between Amazon’s private labels and the company’s classification as a monopoly to find 
out if there are any connections, ultimately asking the question ‘what is Amazon’s end game’? 
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 The sections which follow will explore in-depth Amazon’s private label business and the key 
observations we see arising from the emergence of Amazon’s new brands. We initially theorize that 
through their multiple private label brands, Amazon is attempting to increase their e-commerce market 
share by creating competition for third party firms within Marketplace. We believe private labels will 
bring higher margins to Amazon, further differentiating the e-commerce giant from its retail 
competitors. One outcome of our theory, and the topic of this case study, is the question of whether or 
not Amazon’s private label brands are the tipping point to Amazon being recognized as a monopolistic 
corporation. 
Description of Enterprise 
Amazon’s Emergence from the Dot-Com Era 
All economists, amateur and professional alike, are aware of the dot-com era and the economic 
recession which followed, impacting millions of individuals and thousands of corporations. The 
‘irrational’ environment which spawned the dot-com bubble is known as the ‘Information Age’, a time 
where technology came into focus, enabling unheard amounts of productivity. Generally speaking, most 
economists do not approve of looking at these 40-60 year ‘super cycles’ to draw conclusions but there is 
little doubt that the technological infrastructure built between the 1970’s-2000 created fertile soil for 
internet-based corporations.​ Modern day economists, such as Carlota Perez, suggest that new 
technology has “20-30 years of tech ‘installation’ followed by 20-30 years of tech ‘deployment’” (Gross, 
2015). If this is true, internet corporations founded at the turn of the century (like Amazon) were set to 
take full advantage of the technical infrastructure previously ‘installed’; fiber optic cables were the new 
railroad tracks, paving the road to success for newly found internet companies. 
Founded by Jeff Bezos in July 1994, Amazon (or Cadabra as it was known in the early days) set 
out to change the world or at the very least, change consumers’ shopping expectations. Amazon.com 
was launched a year later with books as their first targeted product category. Founded in the garage of a 
rental home in Bellevue, Washington, this humble beginning helped form the cliché of internet start-ups 
everywhere. However, unlike many of the thousands of internet start-ups who did not survive the 
economic downturn following the dot-com bubble burst, Amazon thrived. Leading up to the 2000-2002 
dot-com crash was a multi-year period of excessive speculation by the entire investment community 
from venture capital and private equity firms to institutional and individual investors. Start-ups were 
told to ‘get big fast’, harness the ‘network effect’, and become a ‘first mover’ by this community (& 
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 business advisors alike) which led to excessive, and many times, over-the-top spending such as Super 
Bowl ads and paying consumers to tattoo website addresses onto themselves.  
Although Amazon was clearly part of this so-called ‘internet gold rush’, they managed to avoid 
much of the hype, opting instead for low budget but impactful advertising. An example of this is 
Amazon’s first TV ad which in launched 1999 and featured an all men’s chorus singing about all of the 
product categories Amazon had expanded to beyond books. However frugal they were, Amazon could 
not fully avoid the aftermath of the dot-com bubble burst as several complementary markets were also 
affected. As many of the top telecommunication (telecom) corporations were lured by the 
unprecedented growth of the dot-com firms, executives found themselves over invested in 
infrastructure (such as fiber optics and 3G licenses) and well ahead of their cash flow. Through Jeff 
Bezos’ leadership Amazon was able to successfully avoid the bankruptcies of these and other 
‘pick-and-shovel’ vendors of the boom/bust to grow into one of the world’s most successful companies.  
Amazon’s Leader & Culture 
Jeff Bezos is often lauded as one of the most brilliant business leaders of all time. Recent studies 
indicate that his highly regarded leadership style of “task oriented, transactional and transformational” 
has directly contributed to Amazon’s success in terms of growth and revenue (Sata, 2015). Amazon’s 
external success comes at a cost though; recent research shows that Amazon isn’t exactly the 
poster-child of internet companies as it deals with internal issues concerning labor unions, working 
conditions, poor pay, and hostile office environments (Chan, 2015).  
An example of Bezos’ predatory, win-at-any cost leadership and culture comes from the 
company’s formative years. When negotiating with book publishers, Bezos’s five observed strategies 
were summarized as: 1) B​e like the Godfather: make them an offer they can’t refuse. 2) Don't give up 
information unless absolutely necessary. 3) Keep teams small enough that members can be fed with two 
pizzas. 4) Stop talking so much. 5) Get adversarial ​(Baer, 2014). While these strategies have arguably led 
to innovative services for consumers that have forever changed expectations and shopping behavior (i.e. 
Prime Day), they form the foundation of a business philosophy implying that to win with the consumer, 
values such as secrecy and obscurity are encouraged both internally and within Amazon’s partner 
community. When Bezos announced that “your margin is my opportunity”, most critics understood him 
as addressing his fellow retailers (Stillman, 2014). Today, we see evidence of this extending well past 
retailers into the entire supply chain and value chain. Even manufacturers’ margins are a target as 
Amazon extends their reach into private label brands. 
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 Another example of a manifestation of the founder’s ambitions is Amazon’s ‘walled garden’ 
philosophy which establishes rules for all Amazon internal developers that the Amazon Marketplace is a 
closed ecosystem (Frieden, 2017). This means that the system’s specifications are kept secret and 
almost no third party software development is allowed. This strategy is typically adopted by firms with a 
long term outlook since developing all services in-house tends to take much longer to deliver as opposed 
to adopting plug-and-play software requiring no additional development. In addition to providing 
suggestions regarding Amazon’s outlook towards their future, Amazon’s command of data behind their 
‘walled garden’ is a primary concern to researchers and the federal government as they explore whether 
Bezos’ has created a monopoly, not necessarily on a particular product category but on the e-commerce 
industry as a whole.  
While Amazon’s nature can be viewed as predatory towards other retailers, they have and 
always will put the customer first as demonstrated by their mission statement from the beginning; a 
ruthless pursuit to do right by the consumer. Amazon’s customer-driven culture is the foundation for 
why Amazon is regarded as one of the industry’s most disruptive firms. Their obsession with the 
customer drives all decisions in the company and in fact has been expanded to form Amazon’s 
Leadership Principles (see Appendix II). While these principles might seem like they’d make a great 
inspirational poster, Amazonians are trained to embody them, transforming the firm's’ culture into a 
stark advantage. 
Amazon’s Financials 
On September 30, 2017, Amazon announced that their Q3 sales rose 34% to $43.7B USD (Fildes, 
2017). Experts estimate, given the year to date performance so far, that Amazon will finish the year at 
$196B+ with ownership of ~44% of all U.S. e-commerce sales (Molla, 2017). The figures reported are 
gross merchandise volume (GMV), which represents Amazon’s retail sales to consumers shipped from 
either Amazon’s warehouse or from third party sellers. These two sides of Amazon’s business, estimated 
to be roughly the same size, are referred to as either 1P (first party) or 3P (third party). 
Amazon is the largest e-retailer in the U.S. followed by eBay, Apple and Microsoft. When 
compared to all offline and online retail, Amazon holds a mere 5% retail market share (excluding food), 
but its growth is rapidly accelerating (Thomas, 2017a). Last year, 58.6% of Amazon’s total sales were 
from the U.S. with the balance (32.3%) coming primarily from Germany and the UK (eMarketer, 2017). 
Fast and early growth can be seen in Mexico, India and other emerging markets. 
The overall Amazon revenue portfolio includes Marketplace (Retail), Services (Prime, AWS) and 
Media (Advertising). For the purpose of this case study we will focus on Marketplace, although it is 
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 worth mentioning that the Prime paid membership/loyalty program is considered the primary driver of 
Marketplace sales.  At the end of Q1 2016, Amazon reportedly hit 80 million paid members in the Prime 
program (Pandolph, 2017). While Amazon does not release total revenue for this program, it can be 
inferred that Prime rakes in nearly $8 billion in sales given the yearly subscription fee of $99. 
Case Context 
A Focus on Amazon Marketplace 
Of all the Amazon businesses, the company is best known for its retail or marketplace platform, 
appropriately named Marketplace, which connects consumers and producers around the world. The 
e-commerce platform is renowned for its ability to facilitate fast and easy sales by eliminating 
unnecessary friction throughout the purchasing journey, causing consumers and retailers alike to view 
Marketplace as the gold standard for online retail. According to research performed by Millennial 
Marketing, “Amazon outperformed all other benchmark brands not only across mindsets, but also 
across generations because of its consistent ability to reduce friction in the consumer journey and stay 
at the forefront of market innovation” (Huff 2016). 
According to the website traffic tool SimilarWeb, Amazon.com’s total visits in October 2017 
were nearly 2.6 billion with consumers spending a bit over 6 minutes on the site and visiting 9.14 pages 
before they left the site (“​Amazon.com Traffic Statistics”)​. As of March 2017 Amazon.com attracted 183 
million unique visitors per month, almost double that of its closest competitor eBay who saw 96 million 
unique visitors (“Monthly Unique Visitors”, 2017). The trend is clear that consumers want to buy online 
as opposed to in-store and they want to buy from Amazon.com. In fact, numbers published by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce estimate yearly e-commerce retail sales for 2016 was 8.1% of total retail sales 
(almost triple the amount since 2006), an increase of 15.15 over the previous year (DeNale & 
Weidenhamer, 2016; Scheleur et al., 2006). Out of US e-commerce retail sales, Amazon.com is credited 
with ~43% of the sales, while also responsible with more than half of all 2016 growth in the US online 
retail market (Zaroban, 2017a). 
Perhaps more impressive than the visitors and market share is that 90% of the traffic to 
Marketplace is organic, meaning visitors found Amazon.com on their own will rather than through paid 
advertisement (“​Amazon.com Traffic Statistics”)​. This number is almost unheard of in the online world 
and is a testament to the strength of Amazon and its influence on consumer confidence. The high level 
of consumer trust in Amazon, secured by programs such as Prime, sets Amazon apart from almost every 
other retailer, including the best known legacy brands. 
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 In addition to providing a platform connecting retailers and consumers, Amazon also works 
closely with its third party sellers to ensure integrity with their consumers is retained throughout 
Marketplace. As of early 2017, Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos claimed that close to 50% of units purchased on 
Amazon.com were sourced from third party vendors (“Amazon: 2016”, 2016), alluding to the large 
volume of merchandisers who currently leverage Amazon’s platform to sell their goods. Selling on 
Amazon is at a cost to the merchant, who can subscribe to either their Professional (monthly fee) or 
Individual (per sale closing fee) selling plans. Merchants also have the ability to distribute their own 
products or chose FBA (Fulfilled by Amazon), which provides merchants with the ability to leverage 
Amazon’s warehouse, packing, and shipping services. 
In addition to the benefits provided to consumers and sellers, Amazon themselves benefit from 
Marketplace in regards to the trove of transactional and consumer data it collects. The following 
sections within this case study will further expand upon how Amazon leverages this data, however it 
should be noted that the majority of the data is proprietary to Amazon, meaning they are the only firm 
who can analyze and make decisions from it. In short, Amazon’s Marketplace provides an incredible 
value for consumers, a wealth of opportunity for sellers, and a laboratory for Amazon to achieve 
long-term e-commerce dominance. 
Private Labels 
Private label refers to brands owned by a retailer. A private label product is produced by a third 
party manufacturer but sold under the retailer’s brand name, meaning the retailer has total control over 
the marketing and packaging of the product. Private labels have the advantage of requiring little 
investment capital, flexibility in production, and increased gross profit since the cost to produce the 
good is lower. Well known retailers (including Amazon) who are able to provide parallel quality and 
features in their private label products may save up to 40% in manufacturing and distribution costs 
compared to brand name merchandisers (Hariharan, 2016). Private label brands have become 
increasingly popular with internet retailers, with observations towards their favorability dating back to 
height of the dot-com era: “while supermarkets and department stores in the brick-and-mortar world 
can take years before they venture into private label merchandise, e-Tailers -in a development that 
echoes the rapid emergence of the medium itself- are developing private label programs as they 
approach the starting gate” (Underwood, 2000). At the time of publication of this case study, Amazon 
currently has ~20 private labels brands across nine distinct retail product categories.  
8 
 Key Observations 
The content of the proceeding sections will explore our key observations in regards to Amazon’s position 
as a monopoly, specifically focusing on Amazon’s introduction of private labels and the impact they’ve 
had on the market. 
Unfair Competition 
By creating the new standard for online shopping experiences, Amazon has already negatively 
impacted plenty of competitors including many small ‘mom & pop’ shops. For those retailers who have 
survived, many are choosing to join forces with Amazon via Marketplace in order to stay in business as 
opposed to attempting to compete directly against Amazon. This raises the question of whether 
Marketplace is really a fair and friendly mechanism for vendors to co-exist peacefully, or is it a bait and 
trap set by Amazon to expand its territory? Previously conducted research concludes that Marketplace is 
a world of coopetition, or a space for business competitors to collaborate for mutually beneficial results. 
While there is little evidence that would argue against this assumption, we wonder if Amazon has 
alternative motives in promoting Marketplace to third party sellers. Some experts suggest that Amazon 
uses Marketplace as a laboratory to understand product performance by leveraging sales and 
consumer-behavior data from third party products before introducing their own lower priced private 
labels. We see this unfair competition as one the barriers which could potentially drive smaller 
merchants out of Marketplace as Amazon looks to expand into profitable new product categories. 
Disruptive Impact on Branded Products 
Private label brands, especially from online retailers, are actively disrupting brand-name 
products as consumers become less concerned with the brand and more with price and quality. For 
example, Scott Galloway Clinical Professor of Marketing at New York University, argues “brands are at a 
bit of a disadvantage online because they don’t have as much opportunities to portray all these amazing 
things they’ve invested in at the point of purchase. They’re not as obvious or as valuable online and the 
typical brand building investments have less purchase or less justification, less value when they go 
online,” in his speech at L2’s Amazon Clinic (Galloway, 2017). Amazon clearly understands the 
weaknesses surrounding online branded products. Plus, the weakness is more obvious when products 
have online reviews, as these can help drive consumer purchase decisions to be based on quality rather 
than brand name. Using technology and reviews from consumers, Amazon has the potential to 
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 dismantle competitor’s advertising, packaging, in-store shelf placement, and labor costs and still provide 
the same quality product as branded product. 
Methodology 
The data provided and analyzed within this case study is a combination of published case studies 
and journals, books, recent news articles, documents released by Amazon, and personal experiences 
with Amazon as consumers. While quantitative data to support the findings of this case study was 
unable to be collected first hand due to time constraints, multiple empirical analyses were leveraged to 
assist and draw conclusions from. Merging quantitative data with expert opinions and personal 
experiences, we are able to draw educated conclusions regarding Amazon’s position as a retailer and 
provider of one of the world’s largest e-commerce platforms. Applying these conclusions against an 
updated interpretation of how monopolies are defined provided valuable insights and allowed for 
predictions to be made regarding Amazon’s future state. 
Literature Review - Monopolies 
The Definition of Monopoly 
The traditional concept of a monopoly is characterized by a lack of competition, which results in 
higher prices and fewer products within an industry. As defined by The Economic Times, “in a monopoly 
market, the seller faces no competition, as he is the sole seller of goods with no close substitute” 
(“Definition of Monopoly”). In business terms, “monopoly can also be used to mean the entity that has 
total or near-total control of a market,” as stated by Investopedia (“Monopoly”). Typically, it can be 
expected that monopolies will raise prices since there are no other competitors in the market and “the 
ability of a monopolist to raise its price above the competitive level by reducing output is known as 
market power” (Krugman, 2016). In the case of Amazon, the company cannot be classified as a 
traditional single-seller monopoly as defined above, but instead has gained power across multiple 
markets as the ‘everything store’, achieving domination through diversification. Amazon’s market power 
is undeniable, demonstrated by their influence over both the online and offline retail markets, however 
instead of raising prices they are lowering them.  
A New Concept of Monopoly 
We are under the agreement that Amazon cannot currently be classified as a monopoly given 
the traditional definition based upon its current market share (Sizemore, 2017). As shared within the 
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 conventional definition of monopoly, goods or services produced by a monopolistic corporation are 
typically associated with higher prices and less competition. Amazon, however, is contributing to the 
deflationary forces that have haunted the economy for the better part of the last decade. However, 
some like editor Robinson Meyer argue that Amazon might possibly become a ‘vertical monopoly’ 
buying up and down the supply chain and essentially barring other companies from competing with it 
(Meyer, 2017). Writer Alex Shephard also stated that although prices may stay low, the effect of 
Amazon’s retail push will be profound for both consumers and producers, with Amazon controlling all 
kinds of supply chains (Shephard, 2017). Both authors believe Amazon could take over the market 
through its lower price benefit to consumers and, as consumers, we wouldn’t even notice. Others have 
pointed out the possibility that Amazon is currently rewriting the definition of monopoly. The word 
‘monopsony’ has been used to describe the situation Amazon has created: “monopsonists use their 
market power to drive down the prices suppliers can charge” (Rosenberg, 2017). And of course, there 
are also some like policymaker Matt Stoller who argue that Amazon is one of “the most obvious and 
most powerful monopolistic institutions that [is] in our culture right now” (Stoller, 2017). 
Regulation against Monopoly 
The attitude that monopolies are detrimental and dangerous to both the economy and 
consumer interests has remained constant over the last century. The U.S. Department of Justice has a 
clear definition of monopolization, “monopolization requires (1) monopoly power and (2) the willful 
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident” (“Competition And 
Monopoly”). Attempted monopolization, which is regulated by the U.S. government, requires that 
corporations have “(1) anticompetitive conduct, (2) a specific intent to monopolize, and (3) a dangerous 
probability of achieving monopoly power” (“Competition And Monopoly”). To regulate monopolies, the 
government created the The Sherman Act in 1890, the first antitrust law, which “proscribe unlawful 
mergers and business practices in general terms, leaving courts to decide which ones are illegal based on 
the facts of each case” (“The Antitrust Laws”). Our interpretation leads us to believe that the 
government’s antitrust laws do not prohibit every restraint of trade but only those which considered to 
be unreasonable. Given our agreement that Amazon’s current state cannot legally be defined as a 
monopoly, there is no legal way for the U.S. government to regulate their business practices under The 
Sherman Act. 
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 Actions Taken  
Emergence of Amazon’s Private Labels 
All firms classified as merchandisers theoretically leverage private labels and Amazon is no 
exception. Driven by a focus on the long-run and a need to create value and lower margins, Amazon has 
quietly and not so quietly introduced about 20 private label brands into their Marketplace since 2009. As 
of 2017, Amazon sells its private label brands exclusively on Amazon.com with products ranging from 
bedding to snack food to electronics. As of October 2017, Amazon has sold approximately $300 million 
in sales related to its private label goods this year, a 12% increase from the year prior (Zaroban, 2017b). 
Two new private label brands within the furniture sector were introduced early November 2017, further 
demonstrating how quickly Amazon is growing its product portfolio. 
To predict the future actions of Amazon and private labels, one must first understand how 
Amazon decides what markets to enter and what products to sell. As alluded to previously, Amazon has 
a pretty selfish motive driving their Marketplace; treating the platform as a laboratory to make informed 
decisions about whether or not to enter a specific market with their own product (Zhu & Liu, 2016). 
Once Amazon has identified a profitable product, they contract with the manufacturer directly to sell 
the same item on their site at a lower cost. It appears that Amazon has reverse engineered the value of 
a brand name on a product, which is often referred to as the ‘brand tax’, in order to remove even more 
margin from the retail price and pass the savings onto the consumer.  In many circumstances, once this 
occurs, the third party seller tries to compete on price but eventually overmatched.  
 Randy Miller, a former director at Amazon, provided further evidence of this with his statement 
of “if you don’t know anything about the business, launch it through the Marketplace, bring retailers in, 
watch what they do and what they sell, understand it, and then get into it” (Stone 2013, p. 182). 
Research has provided concrete evidence backing Mr. Miller’s statement, indicating that within a 
specific product category, “entry by Amazon is more likely for products with higher prices, lower 
shipping costs, and greater demand”, with the likeness for entry increased by the average consumer 
rating of the product (Zhu & Liu, 2016). Armed with their proprietary analyses of marketplace sales data, 
Amazon truly brings meaning to Jeff Bezos’ statement of ‘your margin is my opportunity’.  
Markets have seen firsthand evidence of Mr. Miller’s statement as Amazon quietly launches new 
product lines, some baring the Amazon name while others appear to purposely make no mention of 
their parent owner (for example, Lark & Ro). The most recognized private label is AmazonBasics, 
accounting for nearly 85% of all of Amazon’s private label sales during the first 10 months of 2017 
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 (Zaroban, 2017b). As Amazon’s most mature private label brand, AmazonBasics currently possesses a 
product catalog of over 1,500 products. In fact, a report published by venture capital firm Kleiner 
Perkins, Caufield and Byers found that within the US, AmazonBasics currently holds over 30% market 
share in online battery purchases, far surpassing Duracell (~20%), Panasonic (~13%) and Energizer 
(~12%) (Meeker, 2017). It also is in third place of market share of online purchases for diapers, 
surpassed only by Huggies and Pampers (Meekers, 2017). Amazon has shown no indication of a 
completed product portfolio for AmazonBasics, it can be expected that the firm will continue to search 
for areas of opportunity (high consumer demand, low manufacture costs) to provide consumers with a 
high quality, lower cost option. 
Interestingly enough, not all of Amazon’s private label brands are chasing lower prices. Early 
November 2017, Amazon announced the launch of two new furniture brands, Stone & Beam and Rivet. 
Entering into the furniture business, a brand new product space, demonstrates how much the firm 
trusts their brand and product data to make product decisions. While at the time of publication of this 
case study, the new product lines were too immature to have any sales data available, an educated 
assumption can be made that the lines will succeed. This is based upon Amazon’s credible brand name, 
success of previous private label brands based upon similar market research, and Amazon’s positive 
reputation of quick and easy returns, providing comfort to those who are investing in a large purchase 
without seeing the product. 
 In addition to investing in their own private label brands, Amazon has created an unique habit of 
acquiring firms who already have a well-established private label brand. Case in point is Amazon’s 
buyout of Whole Foods, who is well known for its private label brand of 365 Everyday Value. 
Immediately following the purchase, Amazon enabled sales of the brand’s approximately 2,000 products 
in their marketplace. Estimates indicate in the first month, Amazon customers purchased over $1.6 
million worth of the 365 Everyday Value brand, far surpassing Amazon’s forecast as indicated by the 
number of products recorded as out of stock (Zaroban, 2017b). Amazon’s acquisition of Whole Foods 
and the initial success they’ve experienced with 365 Everyday Value in their marketplace opens a new 
realm of acquiring third party private label brands to drive success. In this case, Amazon did not need to 
use their own ‘laboratory’ to watch market trends and understand product margins, instead they had 
Whole Foods complete the investigative stages for them. 
Amazon’s large investment into private label brands has provided concrete evidence the firm is 
actively searching for new product spaces to enter. “The purchase of Whole Foods is a sign that CEO Jeff 
Bezos’s vision of the Everything Store is frighteningly literal: Amazon’s goal is a takeover of retail itself, 
both physical and digital” (Shephard, 2017). Research has indicated that the motivation behind 
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 Amazon’s advancement is competing with their most successful competitors to commandeer value from 
their innovations (Zhu & Liu, 2016). So far, evidence has shown that Amazon is succeeding in regards to 
overtaking online market share. With the increase in market share, Amazon is not only creating demand 
for their products through lower consumer costs, they are also creating barriers to entry for existing and 
new merchandisers of similar products and turning the threat of an monopoly into reality. 
Growing Barriers, Impact on Competitors 
With Amazon continuing to grow both the product catalog of their private label brands and also 
the categories in which they have private label products, growing barriers within the marketplace are 
beginning to emerge and are negatively impacting both the mature and new third party sellers on 
Marketplace. A 2017 study indicated that about 45% of third party sellers are concerned with Amazon 
competing directly against them, with 59% planning to diversify across multiple marketplaces (“State of 
Amazon”). This decline in confidence of Amazon indicates that merchandisers are already experiencing 
the negative impacts associated with Amazon’s private label brands. We assume confidence will 
continue to decline at an increasing rate as Amazon continues to grow its private label brand offerings. 
Amazon’s introduction of private label brands is just one piece to the way Amazon’s driving 
growth. Behind the scenes, Amazon has the advantage of manipulating their marketplace platform to 
favor their own brands, indirectly driving sales of their products. Manipulation mainly comes in three 
forms, product search, product cost, and scalability, all of which are creating barriers to entry for new 
and existing merchandisers. As these three barriers strengthen, smaller retailers will be the first to be 
forced out of Marketplace, driven primarily by a lack of product sales. Overtime, the question arises if 
Amazon will eventually force large-scale retailers out as well, ultimately controlling Marketplace with a 
wide variety of private label brands, creating the illusion of a competitive market to the consumer. 
A product search barrier to entry is driven by Amazon’s ability to manipulate the way consumers 
search for and view products within the marketplace. By leveraging sponsored ads, recommended 
products, and badging (Best Seller or Amazon’s Choice), the potential exists for Amazon to use their 
search results page as a way to shift focus on their own products, making it harder for third party 
merchandisers to market their products. In the case that Amazon is warehousing the third party seller’s 
goods, Amazon has the ability to leverage its AMS (Amazon Media Services) and AMG (Amazon Media 
Group) advertising platforms, along with powerful website badging including ‘Amazon’s Choice’, to win 
the top listing. According to market research firm Millward Brown, 70% of all consumers will select a 
product on the first page of the search results, with less than 10% stating they would consider clicking 
through to at least the fourth page (Johnson, 2014). Given this research and Amazon’s ability to 
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 manipulate the search results, third party sellers whose products do not appear on the first page are at a 
stark disadvantage, with the risk of their sales plummeting as visibility to their product declines. 
Another barrier Amazon is creating is the ability to provide a competitive product at a much 
lower cost, both to themselves and to consumers. By promoting private label products, Amazon is 
removing the middleman in the supply chain, substantially reducing the price of their private label brand 
products while still maintaining a profit. At the time of publication, AmazonBasics’ AAA batteries were 
available on Amazon.com at a unit price of $0.24, while Duracell’s were listed at $0.66. This substantial 
difference in cost coupled with Amazon’s reputation for high quality, fast delivery, and easy returns 
leaves little reason to the consumer to not purchase from the AmazonBasics brand. As indicated 
previously, multiple merchandisers are starting to feel the direct effect of Amazon’s private label brands 
as their costs are undercut by Amazon, creating a significant risk to sales and profits for third party 
retailers.  
The last barrier, scalability, refers to Amazon’s full ability to control the size of its marketplace. 
Even though it’s an open platform for retailers to market their products, the amount of sellers is finite, 
limited by the capacity of Amazon’s web servers. By Amazon having full control of the market, both 
within consumer-facing and producer-facing, they create an unique advantage that will ultimately give 
them full control over the future of their Marketplace.  
In addition to the growing barriers defined above, Amazon also sets high service level 
benchmarks to ensure retailer compliance. Amazon requires and rigorously enforces their stringent 
service level agreements (SLAs) with it’s third party sellers. Amazon provides sellers with the ability to to 
view their performance scores on a daily basis, along with the fees and fines the seller has accumulated 
for poor scores. To foster compliance, Amazon aggressively fines sellers for things such as late shipping 
and re-packaging needs. Over time, Amazon’s SLAs will systematically contribute to the reduction of the 
total seller count within Marketplace. 
While retailers are feeling added competition due to Amazon’s private label brands, consumers 
on the other hand are benefiting enormously from Amazon’s lower priced private label products. Not 
only are they able to purchase products with guaranteed fast delivery (as Prime customers, 100% of 
Amazon’s private label brands are available, some exclusively), they are also almost always getting the 
best price available for a quality product. The benefit to the consumers is aligned with Amazon’s 
obsession with the customer, indicating that consumers are always the top priority. The relatively quick 
adoption of Amazon’s private label brands by consumers to date has ignited growth and fueled the 
foundation for Amazon to expand its product portfolio in the future. 
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 Predictions 
Amazon will continue to build upon its successes with private label until they have found a path 
to long-term profitability (at least at the product level). By controlling the entire supply chain all the way 
back to the manufacturers, Amazon has succeeded in their founder’s mission to offer consumers the 
ultimate value by disintermediating retailers and other distributors and passing the cost savings onto the 
consumers. Amazon also understands that coupling this with removing themselves from Wall Street 
profit expectations, building the value of their Prime program, and offering the widest selection of 
products at the best prices, they have created sustainable value for consumers, shareholders and 
employees alike. 
We predict from the trends identified in this paper that Amazon’s private label business model 
will eventually extend to every category represented on their website, which will lead to higher profits 
while creating multiple barriers to entry from competitors in the U.S. market.  As private label in 
particular dominates more product categories, more third party sellers will be forced out of Marketplace 
as well as manufacturers who can not achieve or sustain Amazon’s required service level benchmarks. 
We predict that the compounded disruption in supplier/sellers caused ultimately by Amazon’s private 
label brands will attract further attention of the Federal Trade Commission and other U.S. Government 
regulators. However, proving that Amazon is in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act by 
undermining the competitive nature of our free market may have little to none actual consequence.  
Historically, it has been consumer pressure which drives government action against monopolies, 
as traditional monopolies create unfair market conditions for the consumer. However, even when the 
government wins its case the rulings tend to act like a ‘paper tiger’, having little or no impact on the 
single-company offender. History cites cases such as IBM and Microsoft where this effect (or lack of it) 
has been evident. It appears that the government has primarily been effective in discouraging 
monopolies when there is a proposed merger or acquisition between two or more companies. We 
predict that the following course of action will be taken with Amazon: complaints will be filed, Amazon 
will be summoned to testify in federal court, and the media will amplify the facts of Amazon’s market 
share to the public. Once the case is closed and the media has moved on, it will be back to ‘business as 
usual’ for Amazon. 
Until that day, we feel that government intervention is currently in a race with what appears to 
be early stage backlash against Amazon. There are several factors worthy of tracking in regards to this 
backlash, including the ‘tall poppy syndrome’ (Oxford, 2017) and the ‘big brother’ threat from a 
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 company who is strongly influencing shopping habits of individual consumers, whether the consumer is 
aware of it or not.  Another is the notion of ‘coalition’ meaning Amazon may appear to be a giant when 
compared to another other single e-retailer, but if multiple e-retailers, retailers, manufacturers and 
others in the supply chain banded together, Amazon may not be able to sustain its dominant share of 
e-commerce sales. Last but not least is the concept of ‘portfolio management’ which, from a 
manufacturer’s perspective, is where no single retail account should represent more than an estimated 
20%-30% of total sales (Corner, 2015). This practice will work against Amazon as they leverage their 
strength to negotiate even more unfavorable terms with manufacturers who in turn, may actively seek 
out other channels of distribution. 
Some of these headwinds have been predicted by Bezos himself in his many memos to the 
company and famous shareholder letters but one, the ‘Amazon.Love’ memo, emphasizes the notion that 
consumer vote with their hearts as well as their wallet (Chhabria, 2017). It lists company attributes such 
as being polite and reliable, but also that inventiveness should be perceived as that of an explorer and 
not as a conqueror.  So, how is Amazon doing with that perception?  The answer may simply be, ‘it 
depends on who you ask’. 
Lessons Learned 
The Size, Culture, and Growth Aspects of Amazon are Unique 
Over the past twenty years Amazon has dramatically changed the retail industry, from both a 
consumer and merchant perspective. In writing this case study we first and foremost learned the 
measure and magnitude of control that Amazon has over almost every individual and corporation in the 
U.S. retail market. It is the fastest U.S. company to reach 300,000 employees (it took GM 32 years to 
reach that), and with it’s recent acquisition of the Whole Foods grocery chain and plans for a second 
headquarters, the company is now on track to exceed 500,000 employees ranking it second only to 
Walmart at 1.4M U.S. employees (Mandel, 2017; Soper, 2017). As previously stated, the company’s sales 
make up ~44% of all U.S. e-commerce sales, representing about 50% of all e-commerce year-over-year 
growth and nearly 4% of all offline and online retail sales (Molla, 2017). 
Much has been written about Amazon’s unique culture, from its customer-first decision making 
to Bezos’ brilliant leadership to manipulation of Wall Street investors, shunning traditional public 
company reporting of performance (profit in particular). While one of the US’s largest retail companies, 
Amazon embodies a startup mentality by enforcing a strong culture of excellence and agility with its 
‘two pizza rule’. Given Amazon’s uniqueness, it is hard to predict Amazon’s future based upon previous 
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 performance of other retail giants. It is clear that Amazon is a new type of corporation, one that is 
rewriting the rules of retail and challenging the boundaries of the monopoly through its undivided 
attention to the customer rather than the bottom line. 
The Definition of Monopoly is Different Between Economics, Law, and Social 
The main question we set out to answer within this case study, ‘is Amazon a monopoly?’, seems 
to depend upon the perspective of the person who is asking. From the point of view of an economist, a 
monopoly is a​ market structure characterized by a single seller who sells an unique product in an market 
with no competition or close substitutes, and who can enjoy pricing the goods at higher than market 
equilibrium. Amazon is well known for setting prices of their private label brands within Marketplace 
typically well below equilibrium and against fierce competition. Knowing this, we cannot characterize 
Amazon as a monopoly currently. However, through their private label brands, there is the potential 
that Amazon forces its competitors out of the market (Marketplace) and this definition can be 
applicable. 
From a legal point of view, in order to be prosecuted (legally classified) as a monopoly Amazon 
would need to be in specific violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), the Federal Trade 
Commission Act and/or the Clayton Act (later amended by the ​Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act in 1976). It is interesting to note that together these Acts expand upon banning 
outright monopolies and delve into 'conspiracy to monopolize” and “conspiracy in restraint of trade” 
(Federal Trade Commission, 2013). Through our interpretations, we understand this to mean that 
Amazon does not have to explicitly have a visible monopoly in a product category to be brought to 
court. Together the acts ​are aimed at “...​preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of 
trade” (Federal Trade Commission, 2013). As with the economics definition, we make the same 
assumption under the legal definition of monopoly. Amazon currently cannot be classified as a 
monopoly, however future actions of the corporation -propelled by its private label business- create the 
imminent risk of legal prosecution under antitrust acts. 
Lastly we define the social definition of a monopoly as the ‘court of public opinion’, whereby if 
enough consumers complain to their Congressman or Congresswoman about Amazon having a 
perceptive monopoly, it is enough for a probe and public hearings to be established. Given Amazon’s 
reputation of providing high quality goods at competitive prices, consumers would be hard pressed to 
prove that they have been harmed by the ​e-commerce ​giant. However, it is critical to note that 
politicians may be inclined to act not on the consumer’s behalf, but rather that of 
manufacturers/retailers who are pushed to bankruptcy by Amazon’s predatory nature. Applying the 
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 social definition, we cannot classify Amazon as a monopoly, nor can we foresee the corporation meeting 
the requirements as long as consumers continue to benefit directly from their services. 
The Private Label Concept is Both Old and New 
An understated learning of this case study is the business practice behind private labels, where a 
retailer contracts a manufacturer to develop a product under a brand label which is developed 
exclusively for sale in their stores. Nielsen data estimated that the private label market in 2016 was 
$150B but these brands had humble beginnings (Durham, 2017). The original private label is attributed 
to Henry Sands Brooks who opened a clothing shop in NYC in 1818 called Brooks Brothers (Fitzell, 1982). 
Their golden fleece logo of a sheep suspended by a ribbon set a trend that continues to this day. 
Amazon’s rapid adoption and expansion of private label is coming at a time when Target, whose house 
brands were so popular it established their nickname ‘Tarz-shay’, is redoubling their efforts. One of 
many new Target private label brands, Cat and Jack, reached $2B in sales in just one year (Taylor, 2017). 
The trend of private labels is evidently here to stay.  
The Backlash Against Amazon is Coming 
Throughout our research it was clear that Amazon has awoken a sleepy retail channel. Although 
Amazon prides itself on secrecy, it’s new formula for retail (e-retail) success is well studied by its 
competitors. Walmart.com in particular has committed itself fully to regaining its online dominance by 
way of acquisitions (& acqui-hires), new leadership (visionary founder of Quidsi and Jet.com, Marc Lore) 
and leveraging its significant store presence (Stone, 2017). It has launched a price-war by writing an 
algorithm which scours the web for low prices (similar to Amazon’s) and forces Amazon to remove 
products that are not profitable. When Amazon executes this delisting process, Walmart has been 
known to quickly react and restate the original price on it’s site. Amazon then realizes that they are now 
lacking product selection so they try to reinstate the product onto their site - and the loop continues.  
We’ve learned that in general, the shopping environment that we are describing sounds like 
chaos but are convinced that this upheaval will lead to an amazing new era of consumer satisfaction at 
the expense of the retailers. 
Conclusion & Recommendations 
Summary of Findings 
Amazon’s CEO, Jeff Bezos, has a reputation of being one of the most brilliant business leaders of 
all time, with Amazon’s success being directly credited to his leadership style. Over the past twenty 
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 years, Bezos has created one of the largest internet companies of all time, one beloved by consumers 
and predatory towards competitors. Fueled by the optimism and outcomes of the Information Age, 
Amazon has transformed from a online book retailer founded in a garage into a household name, 
radically changing consumer buying behavior. The depth and breadth that Amazon has disrupted the 
retail (and specifically the e-commerce) industry is growing at an alarming rate, fueled by Amazon’s 
desire to become the “earth’s most customer-centric company” (Amazon 10K, 2017). Their unique 
culture and bench strength in digital innovation creates an extremely competitive advantage over 
traditional retailers, and it is clear from their financials that this strategy is propelling Amazon to success.  
Amazon’s most well-known product, Marketplace, enables Amazon and third party sellers with 
the ability to market goods and services to consumers around the globe. While at first glance the 
promotion of Amazon’s Marketplace seems harmless, digging beneath the covers we realize exactly how 
much manipulation Amazon has over the entire supply chain, both that of their own and the merchants 
who sell on their website. Within the past ten years Amazon has created multiple private label brands, 
some with Amazon’s brand name and others without, to compete directly with retailers it provides its 
Marketplace service to. The brands are created based upon proprietary sales data, allowing Amazon to 
quietly identify the product categories which will return the greatest margin. The negative effects of 
Amazon’s private label brands and products are increasingly being felt by third party sellers on 
Amazon.com as they quickly lose market share to the e-commerce giant. 
Looking towards the future, due to their current success with private label we believe that 
Amazon will continue to expand their investment in private label brands, branching out into new 
products and new product categories. Our conclusion brings us to acknowledge the fact that while 
Amazon cannot yet be classified as a traditional monopoly under the economic, law and social 
definitions, their private label brand business is the tipping point into providing the firm total control of 
the market and their Marketplace. Through this expansion the firm could possibly be tried as a 
monopoly in federal court, however analyzing the outcomes of previous monopoly cases, we are fairly 
confident that Amazon will not suffer any lasting impact. 
The economy has changed drastically since the introduction of the internet and e-commerce 
websites, and the definition of the monopoly should be no exception. While conventional monopolies 
typically hurt the consumer with their ability drive high prices, Amazon has revolutionized the way 
consumers purchase products by driving prices down. They are creating a new definition of monopoly, a 
vertical monopoly, which instead isolates the negative impacts to members within the supply chain. The 
question to address now is what will come first? Given that an eventual roadblock is bound to appear for 
Amazon, will the retail giant be tried as a traditional monopoly, or will the laws be updated to extend to 
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 corporations who have gained full control over the supply chain? There is also a third option, where 
neither happens and instead any fallout Amazon may experience in the future will be from the threat of 
retailer/manufacturer and consumer backlash. These options, combined with Amazon’s thirst for total 
control, creates the next question of what the end state of Marketplace truly is. 
What’s Next? Our Recommendations  
We have three recommendations which are required to further enforce the predictions of this 
case study. Our first recommendation is for supplementary research to be performed to further 
comprehend Amazon’s market share in each major product category. While Amazon currently publishes 
very little about their diverse product portfolio, additional information is required to further solidify our 
assumptions. The second recommendation would be to conduct research on the impact to specific 
retailers, manufacturers and third party sellers to determine the total monetary amount in terms of lost 
sales, bankruptcy and market share. The findings within this case study looked at retailers as an 
aggregate, however we anticipate the specific impact of Amazon’s private label brands will affect 
retailers in different ways, dependent on their size, maturity, and product portfolio depth. The last 
recommendation would be to expand past Amazon’s private label brand and look at their impact 
holistically across the entire supply chain (including distribution). While we are confident in our 
conclusion that their private label brands are a tipping point to Amazon gaining control of e-commerce 
retail sales (not necessary a monopoly though), Amazon’s roots go much deeper into the supply chain. 
Private labels are just the beginning. 
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Appendix 
Appendix I: Waves of Technological Revolutions Chart ​(Perez, 2010) 
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 Appendix II: Amazon’s Leadership Principles 
 
 
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B-xdfQv3I1k 
 
Appendix III: Insight into Amazon’s Financial & Market Share 
 
Graph showing % change in Amazon’s stock price vs. S&P 500, Walmart, and Sears. 
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Graph showing estimates of the H1 2017 sales of Amazon Private Labels as well as the Share by Categor​y
 
 
Appendix IV: Miscellaneous 
 
Example of Amazon’s Fees/Fines to Vendors and Sellers on the Marketplace when SLA’s are not hit. 
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